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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3913 
___________ 
 
ASSEM A. ABULKHAIR, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DIRECTOR OF NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-003375) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jose L. Linares 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 3, 2012 
 
Before:  AMBRO, FISHER AND NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 4, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Assem Abulkhair appeals pro se and in forma pauperis from the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey’s dismissal of his complaint.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
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I. 
 In 2011, Abulkhair filed a complaint alleging that the New Jersey Department of 
Human Services (“the Department”) reduced his food stamp benefits in retaliation for 
filing a lawsuit against the Director of the Department.  He asserted that the Department 
reduced his benefits in January 2009 but that a state administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 
later reinstated the benefits.  Soon thereafter, the Director “intervened and reversed” the 
ALJ’s decision.  Abulkhair appealed from that decision administratively and in the New 
Jersey state courts.  See Abulkhair v. Passaic County Bd. of Social Services, 2010 WL 
1753302 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2010).  His federal court complaint asserts 
that the decision to reduce his benefits was “not based upon substantial evidence, [but 
was] based upon fundamental assertion error made up by the Director to retaliate against 
Abulkhair for his suit against her and its agency.” 
 Upon granting Abulkhair permission to proceed in forma pauperis, the District 
Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).  The District Court considered whether it should allow Abulkhair to 
amend his complaint but determined that doing so would be futile, as “the facts as set 
forth . . . seemingly indicate that Defendant’s decision to reduce Plaintiff’s food stamp 
benefits occurred before Plaintiff even initiated a lawsuit against defendant.” 
 Abulkhair timely appealed from the District Court’s decision, and we requested 
that the parties file briefs discussing whether the District Court correctly dismissed the 
complaint without leave to amend. 
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II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the 
District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint is plenary.  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may affirm the District Court on any basis that finds 
support in the record.  Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 Upon our initial reading of the complaint, we, as did the District Court, believed 
that Abulkhair was attempting to raise a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
However, Abulkhair’s appellate brief states that the District Court erred by assessing his 
claims under this statute.  Rather, he asserts that his complaint constitutes an 
administrative appeal from the Department’s and the New Jersey state courts’ decisions 
affirming the reduction of his food stamp benefits.  While the district court may have 
misconstrued Abulkhair’s complaint, we will not remand the case because his claims are 
clearly prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.  See District of Columbia Ct. of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 
(1923). 
 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “state-court losers” are barred from 
“complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments” and “inviting district court 
review and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. 
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  “[T]here are four requirements that must be met for the 
. . . doctrine to apply:  (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff 
complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were 
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rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court 
to review and reject the state judgments.”  Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations, quotations, and 
alterations omitted). 
 Here, Abulkhair repeatedly states that he “filed a complaint [with the District 
Court] to appeal and to contest the wrong determination of his administrative action,” and 
he asserts that he is disputing the state courts’ orders.  His complaint thus asks the 
District Court to exercise appellate review over state administrative and judicial 
decisions, which federal courts lack authority to do absent specific statutory 
authorization.  Parties aggrieved by state administrative and judicial decisions must 
pursue review in state appellate tribunals, with the ultimate opportunity to petition the 
United States Supreme Court for review.  See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291-92 
(explaining the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
1
 
 Accordingly, because the District Court lacks the authority to consider 
Abulkhair’s claims, we will affirm its dismissal of the complaint. 
                                              
1
 We note that Abulkhair incorrectly asserts that federal review of these decisions 
is available because he has “exhausted his administrative remedies.”  As to the basis for 
federal judicial review, Abulkhair’s complaint cites to statutes providing for review of 
decisions made by the Commissioner of Social Security.  Those statutes are not relevant 
to Abulkhair’s current claims. 
